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Background: The sociocommunicative problems in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are traditionally
linked to impairments in Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to ascribe mental states to others. Although
ToM impairments are consistently reported in young children with ASD, findings onmore advanced ToM
understanding in older individuals with high-functioning ASD (HFASD) are less straightforward.
Therefore, we assessed the advanced ToM abilities of a large sample of school-aged children and ado-
lescents with HFASD (n = 194; 6–20 years) and compared them to a typically developing (TD) com-
parison group (n = 60). Methods: Participants’ advanced ToM was assessed with five social stories
containing second-order false beliefs, display rules, double bluff, faux pas, and sar-
casm. Results: Participants with HFASD performed equally well on each of the ToM stories as their TD
peers. Consistent age effects were noticed with adolescents outperforming the children. Furthermore,
advanced ToM was positively associated with participants’ age, verbal abilities, and general reasoning
abilities. Conclusions: Counter to what the ToM theory of ASD would predict, school-aged children and
adolescents with HFASD seem to be able to master the theoretical principles of advanced mental state
reasoning. However, they may still fail to apply these theoretical principles during everyday social
interactions. Keywords: Autism spectrum disorder, advanced theory of mind, children and adoles-
cents, high-functioning, social understanding.
Introduction
For nearly three decades, studies on Theory of Mind
(ToM) have dominated research on individuals with
autism spectrum disorders (ASD; Baron-Cohen,
Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Theory of mind classically
refers to the ability to ascribe mental states to people
and to explain and predict their behavior in terms of
underlying mental states (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
A limited ToM ability may explain the characteristic
impairments in sociocommunicative behavior in
individuals with ASD. Indeed, young children with
ASD generally fail first-order ToM tasks (false belief
tasks), but research findings are less straightforward
with regard to more advanced ToM understanding in
older individuals with ASD of normal intelligence
(i.e., ‘high-functioning’ ASD; HFASD). In this study,
we examined advanced ToM understanding in a
large sample of school-aged children and adoles-
cents with HFASD, and a typically developing (TD)
comparison group.
Children’s ToM has been examined extensively
with first-order false belief tasks (Wellman, Cross, &
Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). These tasks
require children to predict a protagonist’s actions or
thoughts based on a false belief. Young children with
ASD, especially those with an intellectual disability,
generally fail these first-order ToM tasks (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985; Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solo-
monica-Levi, 1998) that are mastered by TD children
at 4 or 5 years of age (for a meta-analysis see
Wellman et al., 2001). However, once the verbal
abilities of children with ASD are equivalent to those
of a typical 11- or 12-year-old, they too perform at
ceiling on such tasks (Fisher, Happe´, & Dunn, 2005;
Happe´, 1995). Hence, children’s success on a ToM
task seems in part dependent on their verbal ability.
Yet, despite their ultimate success on first-order ToM
tasks, children and adolescents with ASD still
experience profound difficulties understanding oth-
ers’ thoughts and intentions in everyday life
(Bauminger & Kasari, 1999; Peterson, Garnett, Kel-
ly, & Attwood, 2009). There is a need for more sen-
sitive measures which capture putative deviations in
ToM understanding in these older groups.
In response to this need, various advanced ToM
tests have been developed, such as the Strange
Stories task (Happe´, 1994). Advanced ToM tests
consist of an eclectic mixture of social stories that all
require a form of second-order reasoning: inferences
about someone’s thoughts and feelings, which are, in
turn, about another person’s mental states (Miller,
2009). In typical development, children are able to
infer second-order false beliefs (‘X falsely believes
that Y thinks’) when they are 5- or 6-years old (for a
review see Miller, 2009). More complex forms of
second-order reasoning such as the understanding
of ironic remarks occur later in development, al-
though exact ages have not yet been pinpointed (Fi-
lippova & Astington, 2010; Miller, 2009). Recently,
advanced ToM tasks have been refined by the addi-
tion of physical state stories or questions that allow aConflict of interest statement: No conflicts declared.
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specific impairment in mental state reasoning to be
distinguished from more general impairments in
reasoning or text comprehension (Kaland, Callesen,
Moller-Nielsen, Mortensen, & Smith, 2008; White,
Hill, Happe´, & Frith, 2009).
The relatively small number of studies on
advanced ToM in school-aged children (6–12 years)
with HFASD indicate some level of advanced ToM
impairment when compared with TD children
(Beaumont & Sofronoff, 2008; Brent, Rios, Happe´, &
Charman, 2004; Kaland et al., 2008; Sobel, Capps,
& Gopnik, 2005; White et al., 2009). Yet, White et al.
(2009) also underscore the extent of individual dif-
ferences in ToM task performance. In their study, a
substantial proportion of children with HFASD per-
formed similarly or even better than a TD compari-
son group on advanced mental state reasoning. At
later ages, findings with regard to advanced ToM
understanding are more equivocal in HFASD groups.
While various studies have highlighted advanced
ToM impairments (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore,
& Robertson, 1997; Kleinman, Marciano, & Ault,
2001), others have failed to document any limita-
tions in ToM understanding (Ponnet, Buysse, Roe-
yers, & De Clercq, 2008; Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, &
Pichal, 2001; Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith,
2009; Spek, Scholte, & Van Berckelaer-Onnes,
2010). In sum, there is currently no consensus on
whether adolescents and young adults with HFASD
are impaired in their advanced ToM understanding.
In this study, we examined advanced ToM in
children and adolescents with HFASD, and com-
pared their performance to a TD group. Because we
aimed to test a large sample with a wide age range,
we devised a short, yet comprehensive collection of
advanced ToM stories that could be administered to
individuals between 6 and 20 years of age. First, we
included the birthday puppy story, which is one of
the most frequently used vignettes targeting second-
order false belief reasoning (Sullivan, Zaitchik, &
Tager-Flusberg, 1994). Second, we included an
emotional display rule understanding task that
highlights one of the most frequent ways of creating
false beliefs in daily life: hiding one’s true emotion by
modifying one’s facial expression (Begeer et al.,
2011). The three remaining stories appeared in the
Stories from Everyday Life (Kaland et al., 2008),
which is very similar to those of the Strange Stories
task. These stories comprised double bluff, social
rule violation (faux pas), and sarcasm. Together,
these five vignettes comprise a global index of
advanced ToM reasoning that represent different,
but interconnected domains of mental state knowl-
edge, some of which may be mastered earlier on
(second order false belief, display rules), and some of
which may be mastered relatively late in develop-
ment (double bluff, faux pas, and sarcasm).
On the basis of previous findings, we expected that
the majority of TD children and adolescents would
pass the second-order false belief and emotional
display rule tasks (Begeer et al., 2011; Miller, 2009),
but would show more difficulty understanding dou-
ble bluff, faux pas, and sarcasm. Compared with TD
children, we expected that children with HFASD (6–
12 years) would show impaired performance on all
five stories. Furthermore, we expected that adoles-
cents with HFASD (>12 years) would only perform
more poorly than their TD counterparts on the latter
three stories.
This study also allowed us to examine how matu-
ration (i.e., chronological age), verbal ability, and
general reasoning abilities (i.e., physical state infer-
ences) are related to advanced ToM in HFASD across
a broad age range. While verbal ability, in particular,
has been shown to correlate strongly with ToM
understanding in TD children and children with
moderate learning difficulties (Fisher et al., 2005;
Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007; Ronald, Viding,
Happe´, & Plomin, 2006), children with HFASD have
been shown to need disproportionately advanced
linguistic maturity before they can pass standard
ToM tasks (Bauminger & Kasari, 1999; Happe´,
1995). It is important to establish, therefore, whether
relations between verbal ability and advanced ToM
are similarly manifest in both groups.
Method
Participants
Via a specialized school for normally intelligent children
with ASD (Berg en Boschschool), we recruited 214
children and adolescents with ASD. School admission
criteria included a normal IQ (IQ > 70) and a clinical
diagnosis of ASD. The clinical diagnoses were estab-
lished prior to the recruitment according to DSM-IV-TR-
criteria by psychiatrists/psychologists who worked
independently from the school and the authors, and
who were unaware of the goals and outcomes of this
study. The diagnostic process included anamneses,
proxy reports, and psychiatric and neuropsychological
examinations. Our strictly high-functioning ASD
(HFASD) sample allowed for the inclusion of a com-
parison group with a normal IQ (Jarrold & Brock,
2004). The comparison group consisted of 73 TD chil-
dren and adolescents and was recruited via public pri-
mary and secondary schools.
We decided to exclude 20 of the 214 participants with
HFASD from the final analysis due to an incomplete IQ
assessment (6), a verbal receptive IQ under 70 (4), or
incomplete ToM data (10). Within the TD comparison
group, 13 of the 73 participants were excluded from the
final analysis due to technical problems (1), incomplete
IQ assessment (3), incomplete ToM data (5), or a high
level of parent-reported autistic characteristics on the
Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; 4; Constantino &
Gruber, 2007). All parents of the final sample of 60
children and adolescents in the comparison group
confirmed that their child had no ASD diagnosis.
The resulting 194 participants with HFASD were sig-
nificantly older than the 60 TD peers (MHFASD = 13.8,
SD = 3.00; MTD = 12.1, SD = 2.85; p < .001), but mean
receptive verbal IQ (MHFASD = 104.7, SD = 12.24;
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MTD = 105.9, SD = 12.22) and gender ratio (HFASD: 165
boys; TD: 52 boys) were comparable for both groups (see
also Table 1). Following Jarrold and Brock (2004), we
examined and, if necessary, statistically controlled for
the possible influence of participants’ age and verbal
ability.
In addition to clinical diagnoses of autism (34),
Asperger’s syndrome (27), or PDD-NOS (130), we gained
diagnostic information on 178 participants with HFASD
(92%) with the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule
(ADOS; Lord et al., 2000). Despite their clinical diag-
noses, admission to specialized education, and parental
reports of high autistic traits on the SRS (M = 80.0,
SD = 22.41), average ADOS score of the participants
(M = 5.5, SD = 4.37) indicated that a large proportion in
fact scored below the ADOS cutoff for an ASD (<7).
Indeed, 64% (114) of the participants received an ADOS
score below the ASD cutoff using the revised ADOS
algorithm (Gotham et al., 2008). These results suggest
that a majority of our HFASD sample may show rela-
tively mild autistic traits. To make sure that any pos-
sible group difference on advanced ToM task
performance between our HFASD sample and TD
sample would not be distorted by the relatively mild
autistic symptoms in our HFASD sample, we checked in
our statistical analyses whether autism severity had an
impact on advanced ToM performance.
Measures
Advanced theory of mind
The five advanced ToM tasks (second-order false belief,
emotional display rule understanding, double bluff,
faux pas, and sarcasm) appear in the Appendix (Begeer
et al., 2011; Kaland et al., 2008; Sullivan et al., 1994).
These tasks were chosen because they were expected to
elicit the strongest differences in scores between chil-
dren with HFASD and TD comparison children (Kaland,
personal communication).
All story narratives were read aloud by the experi-
menter and followed up with a physical state question
(except second-order false belief) and a mental state
question. The physical state question required reason-
ing about a nonmental event in the story, whereas the
mental state question required reasoning about the
mental state of the story protagonist. With the exception
of the second-order false belief task, which included
intermittent control questions, participants received a
typed sheet for each story, which they could choose to
read simultaneously. The typed sheet was taken away
before questioning. Each physical state question was
scored 1 (correct) or 0 (incorrect or ‘don’t know’). These
scores were summed to yield a 0–4 physical state total
index. Similarly, each of the mental state questions was
scored 1 (correct) or 0 (incorrect or ‘don’t know’). The
creation of a 0–5 advanced ToM index is discussed in
the Results. Inter-rater reliability of the mental state
questions was moderate to perfect (20% of the ToM data
were coded double), with kappa’s ranging from 0.57 to
1.00.
Peabody picture vocabulary test-III-NL
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn & Dunn,
2004) assesses receptive vocabulary and is highly cor-
related with more general measures of verbal IQ
(Hodapp &Gerken, 1999). Participants had to select one
of four pictures that correspondedwith a givenword. The
test consists of 17 sets of 14 words, which increase in
difficulty. On the basis of the PPVT, participants received
an absolute measure of receptive verbal ability.
Autism diagnostic observation schedule-generic
The ADOS (Lord et al., 2000) is a diagnostic observation
measure to assess the presence and severity of autistic
symptoms in the domains of social reciprocity, com-
munication, fantasy, and repetitive interests and
Table 1 Description of participants with high-functioning ASD (HFASD) and typically developing (TD) participants, split for children
(6–11 years) and adolescents (12–20 years)
Children Adolescents
HFASD (n = 59) TD (n = 27) HFASD (n = 135) TD (n = 33)
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Range
Age (in years) 10.2 (1.40) 6.4–11.9 9.5 (1.79) 6.0–11.9 15.3 (1.97) 12.0–20.5 14.3 (1.29) 12.5–17.1
Receptive
verbal IQ
103.4 (12.67) 72–127 113.5 (9.72) 99–132 105.3 (12.06) 72–132 99.7 (10.48) 77–125
Receptive verbal
raw score
120.8 (13.82) 93–149 123.7 (15.52) 93–151 155.1 (16.49) 106–191 143.6 (13.22) 115–183
Gender (boys;
girls) (n)
53; 6 27; 0 112; 23 25; 8
Clinical ASD
diagnosis (n)
(Autism; AS;
PDD-NOS)
13; 5; 39 0; 0; 0 21; 22; 91 0; 0; 0
ADOS score
(SA + RRB)
6.2 (4.70) 0–18 - - 5.1 (4.18) 0–18 - -
ADOS severity
score
3.7 (2.78) 1–10 - - 3.0 (2.47) 1–10 - -
ASD, autism spectrum disorder; AS, Asperger’s syndrome; PDD-NOS, pervasive developmental disorder–not otherwise specified;
ADOS, autism diagnostic observation schedule; SA, social affect score; RRB, repetitive and restricted behavior score.
doi:10.1111/jcpp.12007 Anke M. Scheeren et al. 3
 2012 The Authors. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry  2012 Association for Child and Adolescent Mental Health.
behaviors. During a semistructured observation, the
ADOS interviewer offers playful activities (e.g., reading a
story book) and topics of discussion (e.g., peer problems)
to assess the sociocommunicative abilities of the par-
ticipant. Each of the participant’s behaviors is rated on a
scale ranging from normal behavior (0) to clearly deviant
and autistic behavior (2). An ADOS score of 7 or higher is
indicative of an ASD. The ADOS has excellent internal
consistency, inter-rater reliability, test–retest reliability,
and discriminant validity (Lord et al., 2000).
Social responsiveness scale
The SRS (Constantino & Gruber, 2007) is a parent or
teacher questionnaire which assesses autistic traits.
The SRS consists of 65 statements about the child’s
behavior that can be answered on a four-point scale
ranging from 0 (never true) to 3 (almost always true). A
higher total score indicates more autistic traits. Good
reliability and validity have been reported (Constantino
& Gruber, 2007).
Procedure
Upon receiving informed consent from parents and
participants over 11 years, each participant was
individually tested at school. The advanced ToM
tasks were part of a full battery of tests, described
elsewhere (Scheeren, Koot, & Begeer, 2012). All
interviews were videotaped and transcribed, and
coded by graduate students who were blind to the
diagnosis of the participants.
Results
Performance on the mental state questions for each
ToM story is presented in Table 2 for Group (HFASD
vs. TD) and Age (child vs. adolescent) separately. We
conducted separate binary logistic regression anal-
yses to establish the influence of Group and Age on
each of the five stories. Table 2 summarizes each of
these models and presents the observed and pre-
dicted (conditional) probabilities for passing each
task (rather than odds ratios) by Group and Age.
Overall, although some of the advanced ToM stories
were clearly more difficult than others, there was no
evidence that children with HFASD performed dif-
ferently on the mental state questions than their TD
counterparts. Furthermore, regardless of the type of
story, adolescents performed consistently better
than children.
Given such consistency, a composite advanced
ToM score was created by summing the scores on the
five mental state questions, resulting in a 0–5 score,
M = 3.5, SD = 1.17. Despite the fact that the five
stories tap distinct conceptual domains of advanced
ToM, and emerge at different times developmentally,
a reliability analysis was nonetheless conducted to
examine whether any single task elicited qualita-
tively different response patterns. The advanced ToM
score had a Cronbach’s alpha of .46, which is mod-
est, but all items were positively correlated (corrected
item-total correlations ranged between .21 and .32)
and the overall alpha was not improved by omitting
any item. Moreover, these reliabilities confirm earlier
findings on advanced ToM stories in ASD (Hughes
et al., 2000; Peterson, Slaughter, & Paynter, 2007).
Given the theoretical connection between these do-
mains, the composite advanced ToM score was thus
used in subsequent analyses. Below, we further
examine the relation between advanced ToM and
Group accounting for (1) chronological age and ver-
bal ability, (2) physical state inference scores, and (3)
autism severity (ADOS and SRS).
Table 3 shows significant positive correlations
between participants’ advanced ToM and their
chronological age and verbal ability in both groups.
However, partial correlations controlling for verbal
ability revealed a non-significant correlation between
chronological age and advanced ToM in both groups.
Conversely, partial correlations controlling for chro-
nological age revealed a significant correlation
between verbal ability and advanced ToM in both
groups. These analyses clearly illustrate that chro-
nological age per se is not critical for advanced ToM
understanding, rather it is the level of receptive
verbal ability, in absolute terms, that is of impor-
Table 2 Observed and predicted probability (between brackets) of passing the mental state question of each theory of mind story
Children Adolescents Contrast p-values
HFASD (n = 59) TD (n = 27) HFASD (n = 135) TD (n = 33) Group Age
1. Second-order false beliefa .85 (.83) .78 (.81) .95 (.95) .97 (.95) n.s. <.01
2. Emotional display ruleb .92 (.91) .89 (.90) .96 (.97) .97 (.96) n.s. n.s.
3. Double bluffc .46 (.48) .44 (.41) .65 (.64) .55 (.58) n.s. <.05
4. Faux pasd .49 (.50) .44 (.43) .68 (.68) .61 (.62) n.s. <.01
5. Sarcasme .32 (.33) .26 (.24) .62 (.64) .49 (.50) n.s. <.001
HFASD, high-functioning autism spectrum disorder; TD, typically developing.
aThe overall model for 1 was significant, v2(2) = 10.54, p < .01.
bThe overall model for 2 was not significant, v2(2) = 3.04, p > .10.
cThe overall model for 3 was significant, v2(2) = 8.15, p < .05.
dThe overall model for 4 was significant, v2(2) = 9.27, p < .05.
eThe overall model for 5 was significant, v2(2) = 22.18, p < .001.
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tance for both participants with HFASD as well as TD
children and adolescents.
Regarding physical state inferences, an initial 2
(Group) · 2 (Age) ANOVA was conducted with phys-
ical state score as a dependent variable. Results
showed that there were no differences in physical
state inferences between participants with HFASD
and their TD counterparts, F(1,253) = 0.00, p = .96,
but there was a strong effect of Age, F(1,253) = 27.18,
p < .001. Table 3 shows that advanced ToM and
physical state score were significantly positively
correlated within both groups, but this association
only remained significant for children and adoles-
cents with HFASD once chronological age and verbal
ability were controlled for using partial correlations.
Analysis of variance was used to examine possible
effects of Group and Age on the composite advanced
ToM score. Again, there was no main effect of Group
on advanced ToM, F(1,253) = 2.34, p = .13, but there
was a highly significant effect of Age, F(1,253) = 22.80,
p < .001, with adolescents outperforming children.
The interaction between Group and Age was not
significant, F(1,253) = 0.05, p = .83. We also con-
ducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to
examine potential group effects on the total
advanced ToM index, while controlling for the
influences of chronological age, verbal ability, and
physical state score. There was no main effect of
Group, F(1,251) = 1.38, p = .24.
Participants’ scores of autism severity (both ADOS
and SRS) were not significantly correlated with
advanced ToM (see Table 3). Also, none of the sub-
scales of the ADOS or SRS correlated significantly
with advanced ToM (r’s ranging from).13 to .11). In a
final set of analyses, we examined whether autism
severity nonetheless affected advanced ToM when
other important variables were controlled for. We
repeated an ANCOVA with advanced ToM score as
dependent variable, Group as fixed factor with three
levels (HFASD with a high (‡7) ADOS score; HFASD
with a low (<7) ADOS score; TD comparison), and
chronological age, verbal ability, and physical state
index as covariates. Again, no main effect of group
was found, F(2,234) = 0.77, p = .46, confirming that
autism severity, as measured on the ADOS, had no
significant effect on advanced ToM performance.
Discussion
Compared with the myriad of studies on false belief
understanding in children with ASD and varying
intellectual abilities, ToM understanding in children
and adolescents with HFASD has received relatively
little attention. Therefore, we used five advanced
ToM stories to examine the performance of a large
sample of children and adolescents with HFASD,
and compared them to TD peers. Performance on the
second-order false belief story and the emotional
display rule story approached ceiling, particularly
for the adolescents, but the stories about double
bluff, faux pas, and sarcasm were more difficult for
all participants. However, counter to our expecta-
tions, no group differences were found on any of the
stories. Furthermore, adolescents performed con-
sistently better than children, irrespective of HFASD
status. Yet, it was not their age, but rather absolute
verbal abilities and general reasoning capacity that
appeared to underlie better advanced ToM under-
standing.
Counter to some previous findings on advanced
ToM in children with HFASD (Beaumont & Sofronoff,
2008; Brent et al., 2004; Sobel et al., 2005; White
et al., 2009), we did not find an advanced ToM
impairment in children with HFASD (6–12 years).
Similarly, although previous results were equivocal
concerning advanced ToM abilities in adolescents
and adults with HFASD, we did not find support for
an advanced ToM impairment in adolescents with
HFASD (12–20 years). Both children and adoles-
cents with HFASD in our study performed equally
well as their TD counterparts. Hence, when ad-
vanced ToM is operationalized by a set of complex
social stories, high-functioning children and ado-
lescents with ASD appear to be equally capable of
inferring mental states of story protagonists.
Although this finding is incompatible with the ToM
theory of ASD, children and adolescents with HFASD
may nonetheless show limited ability to infer mental
states during social interactions occurring in every-
day life. Indeed, parents report everyday mindread-
ing problems in their child with ASD, even when the
child succeeds on first-order ToM tasks (Peterson
Table 3 Pearson correlations between advanced ToM score,
age, receptive verbal ability, physical state score, and autism
severity (autism diagnostic observation schedule [ADOS] and
social responsiveness scale [SRS])
Advanced ToM score
HFASD
(n = 194)
TD
(n = 60)
Age .30*** .50***
Absolute receptive verbal ability .38*** .56***
Physical state score .40*** .39**
ADOS severity score ).04 -
SRS total score (HFASD: n = 152;
TD: n = 47)
).07 .05
Age (controlling for verbal ability) ).01 .12
Age (controlling for physical state
score)
.23** .38**
Absolute receptive verbal ability
(controlling for age)
.25*** .31***
Absolute receptive verbal ability
(controlling for physical state
score)
.22** .47***
Physical state score (controlling
for age)
.37*** .17
Physical state score (controlling
for verbal ability)
.29*** .19
HFASD, high-functioning autism spectrum disorder; TD, typ-
ically developing.
**p < .01; ***p < .001.
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et al., 2009). Also, adults with HFASD who succeed
on static advanced ToM tasks such as the Strange
Stories, still show ToM problems when evaluating a
videotaped social conversation (Ponnet et al., 2008;
Roeyers et al., 2001). This apparent discrepancy
may be due to the complexity of everyday social
interactions compared with the social situations as
described in ToM stories. Also, the demands of social
interactions are not as explicitly defined as mental
state questions. Therefore, other factors such as
social attention and motivation may crucially deter-
mine whether or not the relatively intact conceptual
understanding of mental states is activated and used
in individuals with HFASD (Klin, Jones, Schultz, &
Volkmar, 2003). Increased attention and motivation
might also explain why a substantial proportion of
our participants with HFASD only showed subclini-
cal symptoms of autism on the ADOS, a semistruc-
tured interaction with an adult experimenter, even
though their clinical diagnoses imply that they
experience profound social difficulties in their
everyday lives.
Several alternative explanations for our nonsignif-
icant results will be discussed below. First, because
our participants with a clinical diagnosis of HFASD
were characterized by relatively mild autism symp-
tomatology with a substantial number not reaching
the ASD cutoff on the ADOS (<7), this mild autism
severity might explain why our HFASD sample per-
formed equally well on the advanced ToM task as TD
peers. However, it must be noted that children’s
autism severity was not related to their ToM task
performance, and a considerable number of our
participants did meet ADOS criteria for ASD. Hence,
mild autism severity in the HFASD group can be ru-
led out as an alternative explanation for the results.
Second, it may be argued that the participants with
HFASD, in particular the adolescent group, had a
slight advantage on the advanced ToM task due to
their significantly older age than the TD comparison
group. However, even after controlling for chrono-
logical age, their advanced ToM task performance
remained comparable to the TD group. Third, it could
be that our measure of advanced ToM was not sen-
sitive enough to detect group differences. The ad-
vanced ToM task consisted of a collection of five
social stories, all derived from previously validated
ToM measures (Begeer et al., 2011; Kaland et al.,
2008; Sullivan et al., 1994). Possibly, the first two
stories were unable to differentiate participants with
and without HFASD due to a ceiling effect. However,
the same pattern of nonsignificant group differences
was found for the latter three stories. Furthermore,
each of the stories, except for the emotional display
rule story, showed a significant age effect with ado-
lescents performing better than children. This shows
that the stories are in fact sensitive enough to detect
potential group differences.
As expected, children’s ToM task performance was
positively associated with their chronological age,
verbal ability, and physical state index (Bauminger &
Kasari, 1999; Fisher et al., 2005; Happe´, 1995).
Importantly, these links were found in both groups.
The positive association between age and ToM could
be largely explained by a third factor: verbal abilities.
Hence, it is not age per se, but an absolute growth in
verbal abilities that increases a child’s success on
advanced ToM tasks. This may not be surprising,
given the highly verbal nature of the advanced ToM
task. However, this finding also raises the interesting
question whether differences in performance on an
advanced ToM task are first and foremost deter-
mined by children’s verbal abilities instead of their
mental state reasoning. Future studies should try to
include advanced ToM measures that are less
intertwined with children’s verbal abilities and more
closely related to children’s social competence in
everyday life.
Positive correlations between physical state and
mental state inferences were only found in the
HFASD group, controlling for chronological age and
verbal ability. This may indicate that children and
adolescents with HFASD rely more heavily on their
general reasoning abilities than TD peers do to solve
advanced ToM tasks. Hence, children with HFASD
may use nonsocial heuristics and general logic to
understand others’ intentions and desires (Peterson
et al., 2009). In typical development, children’s so-
cial understanding is embedded in their experience
of social interactions (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004).
Possibly, a different social interaction pattern from
birth onwards results in a more analytical and the-
oretical understanding of what drives others’
behavior (Klin et al., 2003). As this study has shown,
a different way of understanding other minds may
not necessarily impair performance on a static ToM
task. However, under less than perfect circum-
stances (implicit social demands, time constraints),
such is the case with everyday social interactions,
individuals with HFASD may still experience pro-
found problems understanding the mental worlds of
others. Hence, individuals with HFASD seem to
master the concept of ToM without mastering the
ability to use such insight in the service of their
ongoing social interactions.
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Key points
• Impairments in ToM understanding, the ability to ascribe mental states to others, have been consistently
reported in young children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD).
• However, previous studies on more advanced ToM understanding in high-functioning (i.e., normally intelli-
gent) ASD, particularly in adolescents and adults, have produced mixed results.
• This study showed no differences in performance on an advanced ToM task in school-aged children and
adolescents with HFASD compared to typically developing peers. For both groups, advanced ToM was posi-
tively associated with verbal abilities.
• Even though children and adolescents with HFASD are able to master the theoretical principles of advanced
mental state reasoning, they may still fail to apply these principles in everyday life.
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